The issue of representing attacks to attacks in argumentation is receiving an increasing attention as a useful conceptual modelling tool in several contexts. In this paper we present AF RA, a formalism encompassing unlimited recursive attacks within argumentation frameworks. AF RA satisfies the basic requirements of definition simplicity and rigorous compatibility with Dung's theory of argumentation. This paper provides a complete development of the AF RA formalism complemented by illustrative examples and a detailed comparison with other recursive attack formalizations.
Introduction
An argumentation framework (AF in the following), as introduced in the seminal paper by Dung [1] , is an abstract structure consisting of a set of elements, called arguments, whose origin, nature and possible internal organization is not specified, and by a binary relation of attack on the set of arguments, whose meaning is not specified either. This abstract formalism has been shown to encompass a large variety of more specific formalisms in areas ranging from nonmonotonic reasoning to logic programming and game theory, and, as such, is widely regarded as a powerful tool for theoretical analysis. Several variations of the original AF formalism have been proposed in the literature. On one hand, some approaches enrich the original framework with additional concepts, necessary to modelling in a "natural" way specific reasoning situations. This is the case, for instance, of preference-based argumentation [2, 3] , where a preference ordering among arguments is considered, of value-based argumentation [4] , where a value is associated to arguments in order to account for the concept of preference (an investigation on the relations between preference-based and valued-based argumentation is given in [5] ), of bipolar argumentation [6, 7] , where a relation of support between arguments is considered besides that of attack, or of weighted argument systems [8] , where a weight indicates the relative strength of attacks. On the other hand, some proposals investigate generalized versions of the original AF definition (in particular, of the notion of attack), without introducing any additional concept within the basic scheme, as in [9] [10] [11] . This paper lies in the latter line of investigation and pursues the goal of generalizing the AF notion of attack by allowing an attack, starting from an argument, to be directed not just towards an argument but also towards any other attack. This will be achieved by a recursive definition of the attack, that leads to the proposal of a new framework called AF RA (Argumentation Framework with Recursive Attacks).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the basic notions and fundamental properties of Dung's argumentation framework. Section 3 introduces the definition of AF RA accompanied by a discussion of its motivations and objectives. In particular, AF RA is required to parallel the semantics notions of Dung's theory and their fundamental properties while extending them to recursive attacks in an intuitively plausible and formally simple way. Section 4 introduces the generalized version of the basic notions of defeat, conflict-free set, acceptable argument, characteristic function, and admissible set showing that the relevant requirements stated in Section 3 hold. Section 5 extends to AF RA the definitions of complete, grounded, preferred, stable, semi-stable and ideal semantics, showing that their required properties, paralleling the traditional ones, hold. Sections 6 and 7 deal with further relationships between AF RA and AF . The former shows that when an AF RA coincides with an AF (since no attacks to attacks are present) all the generalized AF RA notions are fully compatible with the original ones. In the latter a method to express an AF RA as an AF is provided. Section 8 draws a detailed comparison of AF RA with the related formalisms Extended Argumentation Framework (EAF ) and Higher Order Argumentation Framework (HOAF). Finally Section 9 summarizes the main contributions of the paper and discusses directions for future research.
Background notions
In Dung's theory an argumentation framework (AF ) is a pair A, → where A is a set of arguments and →⊆ A × A is a binary relation on it. The terse intuition behind this formalism is that arguments may attack each other and useful formal definitions and theoretical investigations may be built on this simple basis. In particular, the notions recalled in Definition 1 lie at the heart of the definitions of Dung's argumentation semantics 1 , each of them representing a formal way of determining the conflict outcome [12] . Definition 1. Given an AF ∆ = A, → :
• a set U ⊆ A is D-conflict-free if ∄A, B ∈ U s.t. (A, B) ∈→;
• an argument A ∈ A is D-acceptable with respect to a set U ⊆ A (or, equivalently, is defended by U) if ∀B ∈ A s.t. (B, A) ∈→, ∃C ∈ U s.t.
(C, B) ∈→;
• the function F ∆ : 2 A → 2 A such that F ∆ (U) = {A | A is D-acceptable w.r.t. U} is called the D-characteristic function of ∆;
• a set U ⊆ A is D-admissible if U is D-conflict-free and every element of U is D-acceptable with respect to U, i.e. U ⊆ F ∆ (U).
An argumentation semantics identifies for any argumentation framework a set of extensions, namely sets of arguments which are "collectively acceptable", or, in other words, able to survive together the conflict represented by the attack relation: for instance arguments that belong to all of extensions can be considered skeptically justified, while arguments belonging to at least an extension can be considered credulously justified. We recall that while the grounded and ideal semantics always identify a unique extension for a given argumentation framework (called grounded and ideal extension, respectively), the preferred, stable, and semi-stable semantics can identify several extensions (called preferred, stable, and semi-stable extensions, respectively) 2 .
Definition 2. Given an AF ∆ = A, → :
• a set U ⊆ A is a D-complete extension if U is D-admissible and ∀A ∈ A s.t. A is D-acceptable w.r.t. U, A ∈ U;
• a set U ⊆ A is the D-grounded extension if U is the least (w.r.t. set inclusion) fixed point 3 of the D-characteristic function F ∆ ;
• a set U ⊆ A is a D-preferred extension if U is a maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) D-admissible set;
• a set U ⊆ A is a D-stable extension if U is D-conflict-free and ∀A ∈ A \ U, ∃B ∈ U s.t. (B, A) ∈→;
• a set U ⊆ A is a D-semi-stable extension if U is a D-complete extension with maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) D-range (given a set U ⊆ A, the Drange of U, denoted as Drange(U), is U ∪U D+ where
It is easy to note that any extension of the above semantics is a D-admissible set, that is, it is able to defend all of its arguments (in the sense that arguments are D-acceptable w.r.t. the extension itself). The notion of acceptability and the related notion of admissibility are supported by intuition and satisfy a set of fundamental properties which in turn entail several desirable consequences, holding even in the infinite case, such as the existence of preferred extensions as well as the existence and uniqueness of the grounded extension. These properties are recalled in the following proposition [1] .
• the D-characteristic function preserves D-conflict-freeness, i.e. given a set
• the D-characteristic function is monotonic, i.e. if
• Dung's fundamental lemma: given a D-admissible set U ⊆ A and two arguments A, A ′ ∈ A that are D-acceptable w.r.t. U, it holds that
• the set of all admissible sets form a complete partial order w.r.t. set inclusion.
Motivations and requirements
In Dung's theory, arguments are regarded as the only entities that may be in conflict with each other and may be defeasible. The issue of extending the framework in such a way as also attacks are allowed to feature these properties has recently received significant attention in the literature. In fact, enabling attacks to attacks and considering them defeasible turns out to provide a useful and intuitively plausible formal counterpart to representation and reasoning patterns commonly adopted in various contexts. For instance, an approach to reasoning about preferences based on attacks to attacks has been introduced in [9] and extensively developed in [11] . In [15, 16] attacks to attacks are considered in the context of reasoning about coalitions, while in [17] attacks to attacks are discussed in connection with the notions of strength, support and temporal dynamics.
The present paper contributes to the research line on formalizing attacks to attacks in argumentation by pursuing the following main objectives:
• encompassing an unrestricted recursive notion of attack to attack;
• keeping the proposed formalism as simple as possible;
• encompassing Dung's AF as a special case of the proposed formalism;
• ensuring compatibility between the semantics notions in the proposed formalism and those in Dung's AF .
As to the first point, in some previous proposals (e.g. [9, 11] ) only one level of recursion is allowed, i.e. attacks attacking other attacks can not in turn be attacked. While this choice may be justified in specific contexts (e.g. reasoning about preferences), we aim at proposing a more general formalism which is able to accommodate various kinds of representation and reasoning needs related to recursive attacks. In particular, further levels of recursive attacks can be considered in the area of modelling decision processes as shown by the following example, which will be used throughout the paper to illustrate the main concepts of the proposed approach.
Suppose Bob is deciding about his Christmas holidays and, as a general rule of thumb, he is willing to buy cheap last minute offers. Suppose two such offers are available, one for a week in Gstaad and another for a week in Cuba. Then, using his behavioral rule, Bob can build two arguments, one, let say G, whose premise is "There is a last minute offer for Gstaad" and whose conclusion is "I should go to Gstaad", the other, let say C, whose premise is "There is a last minute offer for Cuba" and whose conclusion is "I should go to Cuba". As the two choices are incompatible, G and C attack each other, a situation giving rise to an undetermined choice. Suppose however that Bob has a preference P for skiing and knows that Gstaad is a renowned ski resort. The point now is: how can we represent this preference? P might be represented implicitly by suppressing the attack from C to G, but this is unsatisfactory, since it would prevent further reasoning on P , as described below. So let us consider P as an argument whose premise is "Bob likes skiing" and whose conclusion is "If possible, Bob prefers a ski resort". P might then attack C, but this would not be sound since P is not actually in contrast with the existence of a good last minute offer for Cuba and the fact that, according to Bob's general behavioral rule, this provides him with a good reason for going to Cuba. Thus, following [11] , it seems more reasonable to represent P as attacking the attack from C to G, causing G to prevail. Note that the attack from C to G is not suppressed, but only made ineffective, in the specific situation at hand, due to the attack of P .
Assume now that Bob learns that there have been no snowfalls in Gstaad since one month and from this fact he derives that it might not be possible to ski there. This argument (N ), whose premise is "The weather report informs that in Gstaad there were no snowfalls since one month" and whose conclusion is "It is not possible to ski in Gstaad", does not affect neither the existence of last minute offers for Gstaad nor Bob's general preference for ski, rather it affects the ability of this preference to affect the choice between Gstaad and Cuba. Thus argument N attacks the attack originated from P .
Suppose finally that eventually Bob is informed that in Gstaad it is anyway possible to ski, thanks to a good amount of artificial snow. This leads to building an argument, let say A, which attacks N , thus in turn reinstating the attack originated from P and intuitively supporting the choice of Gstaad. A graphical illustration of this example is provided in Figure 1 . As pointed out by one of the reviewers of this paper, alternative formalizations of this example not involving attacks to attacks are possible. For instance, from the general preference for skiing, represented in the example by argument P , one might derive a distinct and more specific argument P ′ representing the preference for Gstaad over Cuba. In this case argument P ′ (instead of P ) would attack β through γ and argument N would attack P ′ (instead of γ) through δ. Of course, the representation adopted for this example -like any formal representation of a real situation -is a matter of modelling choice. In general, we do not claim that there are indisputable, theoretical reasons for asserting that recursive attacks are strictly necessary. Indeed, technically speaking, extended argumentation frameworks encompassing attacks to attacks do not feature an augmented expressive power with respect to Dung's formalism, as they can be translated into traditional argumentation frameworks, as shown for instance in [11] and in Section 7 of the present paper. From a modelling point of view, however, it can be observed that attacks to attacks offer a useful tool supporting a natural representation of some reasoning patterns. As a further example, consider the case presented in [11] concerning two agents P and Q exchanging arguments about weather forecasts (see Figure 2 ). Argument A, asserted by agent P, can be synthesized as "Today will be dry in London since the BBC forecast sunshine", while agent Q asserts argument B "Today will be wet in London since CNN forecast rain". Arguments A and B have contradictory conclusions and therefore attack each other. Preferences may then be expressed by P and Q in order to resolve this undecided situation.
For instance P may state an argument C "But the BBC are more trustworthy than CNN", which expresses a preference for BBC, while Q may reply with an argument C ′ "However, statistically CNN are more accurate forecasters than the BBC" expressing a preference for CNN. The two conflicting preferences attack each other and, according to the preference modeling adopted in [11] , C attacks the attack from B to A, while C ′ attacks the attack from A to B. Agent Q may then state an argument E asserting that "Basing a comparison on statistics is more rigorous and rational than basing a comparison on your instincts about their relative trustworthiness". As argument E expresses a preference for C ′ over C, E attacks the attack from C to C ′ . Now, in order to see how recursive attacks may play a role in this context, consider the following additional argument F asserted by P: "However, BBC has recently changed its whether forecast model, no information on the new model is available; therefore statistics on CNN loses prevalence over personal opinion about BBC". F does not attack neither C ′ that states the preference for CNN's weather forecast over BBC's one based upon statistics, nor E, which states the general principle that basing a comparison on statistics is more rigorous and rational than basing a comparison on instincts. Obviously, it does not attack neither C, nor A, nor B. In fact, F attacks the assumption that E affects the attacks between C and C ′ : while it is generally accepted that basing a comparison on statistics is more rigorous that basing a comparison on personal intuition, in the case at hand, existing statistics are not decisive for a comparison between the accuracy of CNN and BBC forecasts. In other words F provides a good reason for believing that E does not attack the attack from C ′ to C and this can be modelled as an attack from F to the attack originating from E. Therefore the situation remains undecided and both attacks between A and B are still in force.
Given the kind of representation needs illustrated above, we pursue the second and third objectives stated above by introducing in a rather straightforward way the fundamental definition of our proposal, namely the concept of argumentation framework with recursive attacks. • A is a set of arguments;
• R is a set of attacks, namely pairs (A, X ) s.t. A ∈ A and (X ∈ R or X ∈ A).
Given an attack α = (A, X ) ∈ R, we say that A is the source of α, denoted as src(α) = A and X is the target of α, denoted as trg(α) = X . When useful, we will denote an attack to attack explicitly showing all the recursive steps implied by its definition; for instance (A, (B, C)) means (A, α) where α = (B, C).
The formalization of Bob's last minute dilemma in terms of AF RA gives a simple illustration of the use of the formalism.
Example 1 (Bob's last minute dilemma). Let Γ Bob = A, R be an AF RA where: A = {C, G, P, N, A} and R = {α, β, γ, δ, ǫ}, with α = (G, C), β = (C, G), γ = (P, β), δ = (N, γ), ǫ = (A, N ).
As to our third objective, it can be noted that an AF RA is also an AF when R does not include pairs (A, X ) such that X ∈ R.
The fourth high-level objective of "compatibility" concerns the AF RA semantics notions which will be introduced in Sections 4 and 5. The underlying idea is that the basic concepts of conflict-freeness, acceptability, admissibility and the various proposals of extension-based semantics are formally introduced in the context of AF RA, by explicitly considering both arguments and attacks. We remark in particular that, according to Definition 3, we regard attacks as entities which are rooted in arguments and, as a consequence, we require that their inclusion in an extension is possible only in case of inclusion of their source argument too. This choice ensures preservation of the main lines of Dung's wellestablished conceptual framework for semantics definition, while anyway reflecting the extended (in a sense, empowered) role ascribed to attacks in AF RA, in particular their defeasibility.
From a more formal perspective, the objective of "compatibility" leads to the following requirements:
• the fundamental properties listed in Proposition 1 should still hold for the parallel concepts introduced in the context of AF RA;
• in the case where an AF RA is also an AF , a bijective correspondence between the semantics notions according to the two formalisms should hold.
The definition of semantics notions for AF RA in accordance with the objectives discussed above is carried out in Sections 4 and 5.
Basic semantic notions for AF RA

Defeat and conflict-free sets
As a starting point for the definition of any semantics-related notion we consider the concept of defeat. According to the role played by attacks in AF RA we introduce a notion of direct defeat which regards attacks, rather than their source arguments, as the subjects able to defeat arguments or other attacks. This is also coherent with the fact that an attack can be made ineffective by attacking the attack itself rather than its source.
Moreover, according to the idea that an attack is strictly related to its source, we introduce a notion of indirect defeat for an attack, corresponding to the situation where its source receives a direct defeat.
Definition 5 (Indirect Defeat). Let A, R be an AF RA and α, β ∈ R: if α directly defeats src(β) then α indirectly defeats β.
Example 1 (continued). In Γ Bob there are the following direct and indirect defeats: α directly defeats C; α indirectly defeats β; β directly defeats G; β indirectly defeats α; γ directly defeats β; δ directly defeats γ; ǫ directly defeats N ; ǫ indirectly defeats δ.
As a special, but significant, situation note that in case of a self-attacking argument, exemplified by the AF RA {A}, {α} with α = (A, A), α directly defeats A and indirectly defeats itself.
Summing up, a defeat is either a direct or indirect defeat.
The definition of conflict-free set follows directly, requiring the absence of defeats.
The definition of conflict-free set for AF RA is formally quite similar to the corresponding one in AF but they feature substantial differences. A first one, which is quite evident and common to other AF RA notions, concerns the fact that a set of arguments and attacks, rather than just a set of arguments is considered. A slightly subtler one, related to the underlying notion of defeat, consists in the fact that in AF RA every set of arguments U ⊆ A is conflictfree, since only the explicit consideration of attacks gives rise to conflict in this approach. While this may sound peculiar according to the "traditional" view, it is again coherent with the central role played by attacks and, as it will be seen later, does not prevent (indeed it enables) the achievement of the compatibility requirement with AF .
Example 1 (continued). Consider S 1 = {G, C}: as explained above, S 1 is conflict-free as it does not explicitly include any attack. On the other hand, the sets S 2 = {G, C, α}, S 3 = {G, C, β}, S 4 = {G, C, α, β} are not conflict-free. Note also that Definition 7 encompasses sets consisting of attacks only. For instance the set S 5 = {α, β} is not conflict-free since α → R β (α indirectly defeats β) and, analogously, β → R α.
Acceptability and characteristic function
The definition of acceptability is formally very similar to the traditional one, apart from the fact of encompassing sets of both arguments and attacks.
Definition 8 (Acceptability). Let A, R be an AF RA, S ⊆ A ∪ R and W ∈ A ∪ R: W is acceptable w.r.t. S (or, equivalently is defended by S) iff ∀α ∈ R s.t. α → R W ∃β ∈ S s.t. β → R α.
Note that while acceptability is defined with reference to a set S possibly including both arguments and attacks, only attacks are "effective" as far as acceptability is concerned. In fact it is easy to see that an element (either argument or attack) is acceptable w.r.t. a set S if and only if it is acceptable w.r.t. to S ∩ R.
Example 1 (continued). Considering Γ Bob , it can be seen that G is acceptable w.r.t. {γ} and w.r.t. {α}, while it is not acceptable w.r.t. {P }. As other examples, β is acceptable w.r.t. {δ}, and γ is acceptable w.r.t. {ǫ}.
Lemma 1 shows that the acceptability of an attack implies the acceptability of its source, in accordance with the requirements mentioned in Section 3. Lemma 1. Let A, R be an AF RA and S ⊆ A ∪ R. If an attack α ∈ R is acceptable w.r.t S, then src(α) is acceptable w.r.t to S.
The definition of characteristic function parallels the traditional one.
Definition 9. The characteristic function F Γ of an AF RA Γ = A, R is defined as follows:
Propositions 2 and 3 show that the fundamental properties of preserving conflict-freeness and being monotonic hold for the AF RA characteristic function, as required.
Proof. Assume that there are α and V in F Γ (S) such that α → R V . By the acceptability of V , there exists β ∈ S s.t. β → R α. Then, by the acceptability of α there is β ′ ∈ S s.t. β ′ → R β, contradicting the hypothesis that S is conflict-free. Therefore F Γ (S) is conflict-free.
.e. that every V which is acceptable w.r.t. S is acceptable w.r.t. S ′ . Suppose that V is acceptable w.r.t. S but not w.r.t. S ′ . Then, ∃α ∈ R s.t. α → R V and ∄β ∈ S ′ s.t. β → R α, which, since S ⊆ S ′ , implies ∄β ∈ S s.t. β → R α, which contradicts the hypothesis that V is acceptable w.r.t. S.
Admissibility
The definition of admissible sets in AF RA requires conflict-freeness and acceptability of all set elements, exactly as in AF .
Definition 10 (Admissibility). Let Γ = A, R be an AF RA: S ⊆ A ∪ R is admissible iff it is conflict-free and each element of S is acceptable w.r.t. S (i.e. S ⊆ F Γ (S)).
As required, a parallel of Dung's fundamental lemma holds in the context of AF RA.
Lemma 2 (Fundamental lemma). Let A, R be an AF RA, S ⊆ A ∪ R an admissible set and V , V ′ ∈ A ∪ R elements acceptable w.r.t. S. Then:
Proof.
1. V is acceptable w.r.t. S therefore each element of S ′ is acceptable w.r.t. S ′ . Suppose S ′ is not conflict-free; therefore there exists an element W ∈ S such that either V → R W or W → R V . From the admissibility of S and the acceptability of V there exists an elementW ∈ S such that W → R W orW → R V . Since S is conflict-free it follows thatW → R V . But then from the acceptability of V there must exist an elementŴ ∈ S such thatŴ → RW . Contradiction. 2. Immediate from Proposition 3.
The following theorem completes the verification that AF RA satisfies all the fundamental properties of Dung's theory listed in Proposition 1. Theorem 1. Let Γ be an AF RA. The set of all admissible sets of Γ forms a complete partial order with respect to set inclusion.
Proof. We have to prove that (i) the set of all admissible sets has a least element and (ii) each chain of admissible sets has a least upper bound. Point (i) immediately follows from the fact that the empty set is admissible, therefore it is obvioulsy the least element. As for (ii), let Ω be a chain of admissible sets: we prove that S = ω∈Ω ω is admissible, thus obviously a least upper bound of Ω. First, S is conflict-free, otherwise ∃U , V ∈ S such that U → R V , entailing that ∃ω ∈ Ω such that U , V ∈ ω and contradicting the admissibility of ω. Second, suppose that U ∈ S and V → R U : we have to prove that ∃W ∈ S such that W → R V . The conclusion follows from the fact that ∃ω ∈ Ω such that U ∈ ω, and since ω is admissible ∃W ∈ ω ⊆ S such that W → R V .
Example 1 (continued). In Γ Bob there are fourty admissible sets, denoted in the following as AS i . First observe that according to Definition 10 the empty set is admissible for any AF RA, thus we have AS 1 = ∅. As to sets consisting of arguments only, note that only unattacked arguments can be admissible by themselves since in AF RA defense is carried out by attack elements (for instance G requires α for its defense). Thus we have AS 2 = {P }, AS 3 = {A}, and of course their union AS 6 = {A, P } (the adopted numbering is in accordance with Figure 3 ). Also singletons consisting of (directly or indirectly) unattacked attacks and those able to defend themselves on their own are of course admissible, yielding AS 4 = {α} and AS 5 = {ǫ} (note for instance that δ is indirectly defeated by ǫ and it does not defend itself). Of course any set including only these individually admissible elements is admissible too, giving rise to 11 further admissible sets: AS 6 = {A, P }, AS 9 = {P, ǫ}, AS 10 = {A, ǫ}, AS 11 = {P, α}, AS 12 = {A, α}, AS 13 = {ǫ, α}, AS 14 = {P, ǫ, α}, AS 15 = {A, ǫ, α}, AS 20 = {A, P, α}, AS 21 = {A, P, ǫ}, AS 34 = {A, P, ǫ, α}.
Considering now defense by individually admissible attacks we note that ǫ defends γ by indirectly defeating δ and α defends G by indirectly defeating β, leading to AS 7 = {ǫ, γ}, AS 8 = {G, α}. Of course the union of these two sets, being conflict-free, is admissible too, leading to AS 32 = {G, ǫ, γ, α}. Adding other unattacked elements to any of these three sets preserves admissibility, leading to the following 14 admissible sets:
Since γ, being defended by ǫ, in turn defends G by directly defeating β, the set AS 19 = {G, ǫ, γ} is admissible. Again, adding unattacked elements gives rise to the following 6 further admissible sets: AS 28 = {P, G, ǫ, γ}, AS 29 = {A, G, ǫ, γ}, AS 35 = {P, G, ǫ, γ, α}, AS 36 = {A, G, ǫ, γ, α}, AS 38 = {A, P, G, ǫ, γ}, AS 40 = {A, P, G, ǫ, γ, α}. Figure 3 shows the Hasse diagram (w.r.t. set inclusion) of the admissible sets listed above. Coherently with Theorem 1 this is a complete partial order with the empty set as minimal element at the bottom (as for any AF RA and for any AF ) and (at least) one maximal admissible set, namely AS 40 .
Semantics for AF RA
In this section we define and analyse the AF RA semantics corresponding to the ones listed in Definition 2.
Complete Semantics
The notion of complete extension closely parallels the traditional one by requiring admissibility and the inclusion of any acceptable argument.
Definition 11 (Complete extension). Let Γ = A, R be an AF RA. A set S ⊆ A ∪ R is a complete extension if and only if S is admissible and every element of A ∪ R which is acceptable w.r.t. S belongs to S, i.e. F Γ (S) ⊆ S. By inspection of Definitions 10 and 11 it is immediate to see that a complete extension can be equivalently characterized as a conflict-free set S which is a fixed point of F Γ , i.e. such that F Γ (S) = S.
Example 1 (continued). In Γ Bob there is exactly one complete extension: {A, P, G, ǫ, γ, α}.
We introduce also a more articulated AF RA (shown in Figure 4 ) which will be useful for illustration and comparison of the semantics to be introduced in the following.
Example 2. Let Γ = A, R be an AF RA, where: A = {A, B, C, D, E, F, G}, and R = {α, β, γ, δ, ǫ, η, ζ, θ, ι, κ} with α = (A, B), β = (B, α),
As to the complete extensions of Γ, note first that the unattacked elements are E, C and γ and that γ defends both B and β by directly defeating α. It follows that {B, C, E, β, γ} is a complete extension. Further note that θ defends itself, F and ι by indirectly defeating ζ and, analogously, ζ defends itself and A by indirectly defeating θ. This gives rise to two further complete extensions, namely {B, C, E, F, β, γ, θ, ι} and {A, B, C, E, β, γ, ζ}. All other arguments and attacks in Γ have no defense and hence do not belong to any admissible set or complete extension.
Grounded Semantics
The definition of grounded semantics parallels Dung's one: as in his approach, the basic properties of the characteristic function (whose validity we have already proved also in the context of AF RA) ensure the uniqueness of the grounded extension and the fact that it can be equivalently characterized as the least complete extension.
Definition 12 (Grounded extension). Let Γ = A, R be an AF RA. The grounded extension of Γ is the least fixed point of F Γ .
Lemma 3. The grounded extension is the least complete extension.
The identification of the grounded extension in Examples 1 and 2 follows easily.
Example 1 (continued). The grounded extension of Γ Bob is {A, P, G, ǫ, γ, α}.
Example 2 (continued). The grounded extension of Γ is {B, C, E, β, γ}.
Preferred semantics
As expected, preferred extensions are defined as maximal admissible sets.
Definition 13 (Preferred extension). Let Γ = A, R be an AF RA. A set S ⊆ A ∪ R is a preferred extension of Γ iff it is a maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) admissible set.
Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 follow directly from Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Let Γ = A, R be an AF RA. For each admissible set S of Γ, there exists a preferred extension E of Γ such that S ⊆ E. Corollary 1. Every AF RA possesses at least one preferred extension.
It also holds that preferred extensions are complete (and hence can be equivalently characterized as maximal complete extensions).
Lemma 4. Every preferred extension is a complete extension, but not vice versa.
Proof. Let S be a preferred extension which is not complete, then ∃V / ∈ S which is acceptable w.r.t. S and by the fundamental lemma (Lemma 2) S ∪ {V } is admissible: but this contradicts the maximality of S. As to the other point, in Example 2 one of the complete extensions is not preferred (see below).
Maximal complete extensions are easily identified in Examples 1 and 2.
Example 1 (continued). In Γ Bob the only preferred extension is the grounded extension, i.e. {A, P, G, ǫ, γ, α}.
Example 2 (continued). The preferred extensions of Γ are {B, C, E, F, β, γ, θ, ι} and {A, B, C, E, β, γ, ζ}, while the complete (and grounded) extension {B, C, E, β, γ} is not preferred since it is not maximal w.r.t. set inclusion.
Stable semantics
Stable semantics is based, as usual, on the idea that each extension attacks all elements not included in it.
Definition 14 (Stable extension). Let Γ = A, R be an AF RA. A set S ⊆ A ∪ R is a stable extension of Γ if and only if S is conflict-free and ∀V ∈ A ∪ R, V / ∈ S, ∃α ∈ S s.t. α → R V .
Stable extensions are also preferred, but not vice versa. In particular, as in AF , there are cases where no extensions complying with Definition 14 exist.
Lemma 5. Every stable extension is a preferred extension, but not vice versa.
Proof. It is easy to see that each stable extension is a maximal complete extension, hence a preferred extension. To show that the reverse does not hold, consider an AF RA consisting just of a self-defeating argument: Γ = A, R with A = {A}, R = {(A, A)}. The empty set is a preferred extension of Γ but clearly is not stable.
Example 1 (continued). The only stable extension of Γ Bob is {A, P, G, ǫ, γ, α}.
Example 2 (continued). The two preferred extensions of Γ are not stable. In particular neither of them includes nor defeats the elements δ, ǫ, η, and D.
Semi-stable semantics
Semi-stable semantics [18] is based on the idea of prescribing the maximization of both the arguments included in an extension and those attacked by it, i.e. of maximizing the extension range.
Definition 15 (Range). Let Γ = A, R be an AF RA and let S ⊆ A ∪ R be a set of arguments and attacks. The range of S, denoted as range(S), is defined as S ∪ S + where S + = {V ∈ A ∪ R|∃α ∈ S s.t. α → R V }.
Definition 16 (Semi-stable extension). Let Γ = A, R be an AF RA, a set S ⊆ A ∪ R is a semi-stable extension iff S is a complete extension with maximal (w.r.t set inclusion) range.
Proposition 4 summarizes the relations of semi-stable with stable and preferred semantics in AF RA, paralleling those holding in AF .
Proposition 4. For any AF RA Γ = A, R 1. if stable extensions exist, then they coincide with semi-stable extensions; 2. every semi-stable extension is preferred but not viceversa.
Proof. As to the first point, note that, by definition, the range of any stable extension coincides with A ∪ R, which is of course the largest possible one. Moreover stable extensions are admissible sets by Lemma 5, hence the conclusion. As to the second point, suppose a semi-stable extension S is not preferred, i.e. there is an admissible set S ′ strictly including it: the range of S ′ strictly includes the range of S, contradicting the hypothesis that S is a semi-stable extension. On the other hand there are preferred extensions which are not semi-stable as in Example 2 (see below).
Example 1 (continued). The only semi-stable extension of Γ Bob is {A, P, G, ǫ, γ, α}.
Example 2 (continued). Consider the preferred extensions of Γ. Letting S = {B, C, E, F, β, γ, θ, ι} it holds S + = {G, A, α, ζ, κ}. On the other hand letting S * = {A, B, C, E, β, γ, ζ} it holds S + * = {F, α, θ, ι}. S is the only semi-stable extension of Γ since (S ∪ S + ) (S * ∪ S + * ).
Ideal semantics
Ideal semantics [19] considers the largest admissible set included in all preferred extensions.
Definition 17 (Ideal extension). Let Γ = A, R be an AF RA. A set S ⊆ A∪R is ideal iff S is admissible and ∀Π s.t. Π is a preferred extension of Γ, S ⊆ Π. The ideal extension is the maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) ideal set.
Definition 17 anticipates the uniqueness of ideal extension shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. The ideal extension is unique.
Proof. Suppose that there are two distinct maximal ideal sets S and S ′ complying with Definition 17. Now S ∪ S ′ is included in all the preferred extensions, hence it is conflict-free, and defends all its elements, hence it is also admissible. Therefore S ∪ S ′ is a larger ideal set than S and S ′ , contradicting the hypothesis.
It can also be seen that the ideal extension includes all acceptable elements, i.e. it is a complete extension.
Lemma 6. The ideal extension is a complete extension.
Proof. The ideal extension is admissible by definition, thus it is sufficient to show that it includes any element V which is acceptable w.r.t. it. Since the ideal extension is contained in any preferred extension, it is easy to see that V is acceptable w.r.t any preferred extension too. By Lemma 4 the preferred extensions are also complete, therefore they must all include V . As a consequence, V is included in the ideal extension, otherwise including it would give rise by the fundamental lemma (Lemma 2) to a strictly greater admissible set contained in all preferred extensions, contradicting the maximality of the ideal extension.
Since the grounded extension is included in all complete extensions (and hence in all preferred extensions) and is admissible, the ideal extension is a (possibly strict) superset of the grounded extension.
Example 1 (continued). The ideal extension of Γ Bob is {A, P, G, ǫ, γ, α}.
Example 2 (continued). The ideal extension of Γ is {B, C, E, β, γ}.
Compatibility with AF
In this section we prove the satisfaction of the compatibility requirement formally stated at the end of Section 3 for the case where a given AF RA is an AF . To be precise, throughout this section when stating "let Γ = A, R be an AF ", we will consider that Γ is an AF RA such that attacks involve just arguments rather than being directed against other attacks (formally, R ⊆ A × A).
First of all, it is easy to see that, in this case, a dual property holds w.r.t. Lemma 1.
Lemma 7. Let Γ = A, R be an AF and S ⊆ (A ∪ R). If an argument A ∈ A is acceptable w.r.t. S, then any α ∈ R such that src(α) = A is acceptable w.r.t.
S.
Proof. We prove that α is defended by S from any attack. For any β such that β → R α, β does not directly attack α since A, R is an AF . As a consequence, it must be the case that β → R src(α), i.e. β → R A: since A is acceptable w.r.t. S, then ∃γ ∈ S s.t. γ → R β.
As anticipated above, we show that in the case of an AF the semantics defined in Section 5 reduce to those adopted in the context of the traditional Dung's framework. Of course, this correspondence can only be established through a mapping, since extensions in AF RA, differently from those in the traditional Dung's framework, include both arguments and attacks. Accordingly, Definition 18 provides a natural way to extend sets of arguments (corresponding to traditional extensions) into sets of arguments and attacks (corresponding to AF RA extensions).
Definition 18 (→ AF RA operator). Let Γ = A, R be an AF RA. Given a set of arguments U ⊆ A, U →AF RA U ∪ {α ∈ R | src(α) ∈ U}.
In words, given a set of arguments U ⊆ A, the → AF RA operator completes U with all of the attacks arising from it. This operator will play a key role in proving the satisfaction of compatibility requirements for all the considered semantics (Propositions 6-11). In fact, given a semantics Σ, the compatibility requirement (in the case where a given AF RA is an AF ) will be expressed as a bijective correspondence, through the → AF RA operator, between (i) extensions prescribed by Σ in the traditional AF formulation, and (ii) extensions prescribed by Σ in the AF RA formulation. More specifically, we will show for each semantics Σ that if a set of arguments U is an AF extension according to Σ then U →AF RA is an AF RA extension according to Σ and, vice versa, if a set of arguments and attacks S is an AF RA extension according to Σ then there is a set of arguments U such that S = U →AF RA and U is an AF extension according to Σ.
The use of the → AF RA operator to prove these correspondences is supported by Lemmata 1 and 7. The relevant properties shown in Lemma 8 will be exploited in the following.
Lemma 8. Let Γ = A, R be an AF RA, and let U 1 , U 2 ⊆ A two sets of arguments. It holds that:
→AF RA
Proof.
1. As for the ⇒ direction, let V ∈ U 1 →AF RA . If V is an argument then by definition V ∈ U 1 ⊆ U 2 thus V also belongs to U 2 →AF RA . In the other case V ∈ R and by definition ∃A ∈ U 1 : A = src(V ), thus A ∈ U 2 and, again by definition, V ∈ U 2 →AF RA . As for the other direction, if an argument A ∈ U 1 then it belongs to U 1 →AF RA ⊆ U 2 →AF RA , and since it is an argument then it must be the case that A ∈ U 2 . 2. Taking into account the previous point, for the ⇒ direction we have just to show that, considering an argument A ∈ U 2 such that A / ∈ U 1 , it holds by definition that A ∈ U 2 →AF RA but A / ∈ U 2 →AF RA , entailing that
→AF RA . As for the other direction, by the hypothesis ∃V ∈ U 2 →AF RA : V / ∈ U 1 →AF RA . If V is an argument then by definition V ∈ U 2 and V / ∈ U 1 , if V ∈ R then these conditions hold for src(V ): in any case,
A key role in proving the satisfaction of the compatibility requirement is played by showing in Proposition 6 that the desired bijective correspondence between AF RA and AF extensions holds for the case of complete semantics.
Proposition 6. Let Γ = A, R be an AF . Then, S is a complete extension of Γ iff S = U →AF RA where U is a D-complete extension of Γ.
Proof. ⇒. We first show that S = (S ∩ A) →AF RA . In fact, for any V ∈ S if V ∈ A then it obviously belongs to (S ∩ A) →AF RA . In the other case, namely V ∈ R, V is acceptable w.r.t. S since it belongs to S which is a complete extension, thus by Lemma 1 src(V ) ∈ (S ∩ A), which by definition of the → AF RA operator entails V ∈ (S ∩ A)
→AF RA . On the other hand, for any V ∈ (S ∩ A) →AF RA if V ∈ A then it obviously belongs to S; in the other case src(V ) ∈ S and V ∈ S follows from Lemma 7 and the fact that S is a complete extension. According to this result, we have to show that (S ∩A) is a D-complete extension. First, (S ∩ A) is D-conflict-free, otherwise there would exist A, B ∈ (S ∩ A) with (A, B) ∈→, i.e. letting α = (A, B) we would have α → R B with src(α) = A: since both B and α belong to S = (S ∩ A) →AF RA , S would not be conflict-free, contradicting the hypothesis. Then, we show that (S∩A) is D-admissible, i.e. given A ∈ (S∩A), for any B ∈ A such that (B, A) ∈→ ∃C ∈ (S ∩ A) such that (C, B) ∈→. Since (B, A) ∈→, letting α = (B, A) yields α → R A with src(α) = B. Since A ∈ S and S is admissible by the hypothesis, ∃β ∈ S : β → R α, which taking into account that Γ is an AF yields β → R B. Since β ∈ S = (S ∩ A) →AF RA , src(β) ∈ S, and the thesis follows from (src(β), B) ∈→. Finally, we prove that (S ∩ A) is D-complete by showing that, for any A ∈ A which is D-acceptable w.r.t. (S ∩A), A is acceptable w.r.t. S: by the hypothesis that S is a complete extension it then follows that A ∈ S, i.e. A ∈ (S ∩ A). Let us then consider an attack α ∈ R such that α → R A. Obviously this is equivalent to (src(α), A) ∈→, and since A is D-acceptable w.r.t. (S ∩ A), ∃B ∈ (S ∩ A) : (B, src(α)) ∈→. Letting β = (B, src(α)), we have β → R α, and since B ∈ (S ∩ A) then also β ∈ S = (S ∩ A) →AF RA . Summing up, for any α ∈ R such that α → R A ∃β ∈ S such that β → R α.
⇐. We have to show that U →AF RA is a complete extension, namely conflictfree, admissible and including all acceptable elements. As to the first point, assume by contradiction that ∃α, V ∈ U →AF RA such that α → R V . While α ∈ R by definition, V either belongs to A or to R. In the first case we have (src(α), V ) ∈→, and by definition of U →AF RA both src(α) and V belong to U, contradicting the fact that U is D-conflict-free. In the other case, i.e. V is an attack, since Γ is an AF we have α → R src(V ), i.e. (src(α), src(V )) ∈→. But α, V ∈ U →AF RA entails src(α), src(V ) ∈ U, again contradicting the fact that U is D-conflict-free. To show that U →AF RA is admissible, consider a generic V ∈ U →AF RA and suppose that ∃α ∈ R such that α → R V . Taking into account that Γ is an AF and that by definition U →AF RA includes the sources of all the attacks it includes, it is easy to see that ∃A ∈ U such that α → R A (where A is either V or src(V )). Therefore (src(α), A) ∈→, and since U is D-admissible ∃B ∈ U : (B, src(α)) ∈→. Letting β = (B, src(α)), we have β → R α and by definition of U →AF RA it is the case that β ∈ U →AF RA . Finally, we have to show that if V is acceptable w.r.t. U →AF RA then V ∈ U →AF RA . If V is an argument, taking into account that Γ is an AF , the conclusion follows from the D-completeness of U. If V is an attack, we prove that src(V ) is D-acceptable w.r.t. U, which, taking into account that U is a D-complete extension, implies that src(V ) ∈ U, in turn entailing V ∈ U →AF RA by the definition of U →AF RA . Thus, assume that there is A ∈ A such that (A, src(V )) ∈→. Letting α = (A, src(V )), α → R V and since V is acceptable w.r.t. U →AF RA which is admissible by the previous point, there is β ∈ U →AF RA such that β → R α. Since Γ is an AF it must be the case that β → R A, obviously entailing that (src(β), A) ∈→ with src(β) ∈ U by the definition of U →AF RA .
To exemplify this correspondence, consider the following example graphically represented in Figure 5 . This result can be extended to prove an analogous correspondence between the preferred and the D-preferred extensions, the grounded and the D-grounded extension, as well as the stable and the D-stable extensions.
Proposition 7. Let Γ = A, R be an AF . Then, S is a preferred extension of Γ iff S = U →AF RA where U is a D-preferred extension of Γ.
Proof. ⇒. If S is a preferred extension, then by Lemma 4 it is also a complete extension, therefore by Proposition 6 S = U →AF RA where U is a D-complete extension of Γ. Assume by contradiction that U is not a D-preferred extension of Γ: then there is a D-preferred extension (which is also a complete extension) U ′ ⊆ A such that U U ′ , entailing by Lemma 8(2) that U →AF RA U ′ →AF RA . Furthermore, Proposition 6 entails that U ′ →AF RA is a complete extension, and in particular an admissible set: but this contradicts the fact that U →AF RA = S is a preferred extension.
⇐. If U is a D-preferred extension of Γ it is in particular a D-complete extension, therefore Proposition 6 entails that S = U →AF RA is a complete extension of Γ. Assuming by contradiction that it is not maximal, by Theorem 2 and Lemma 4 there is a complete extension S ′ such that S S ′ , and by Proposition 6 it turns out that S ′ = U ′ →AF RA where U ′ is a D-complete extension of Γ. However, S S ′ entails by Lemma 8(2) that U U ′ , contradicting the fact that U is a D-preferred extension of Γ. 
U
→AF RA , where U ′ →AF RA is by Proposition 6 a complete extension of Γ: but this contradicts the fact that S = U →AF RA is the least complete extension of Γ.
Proposition 9. Let Γ = A, R be an AF . Then, S is a stable extension of Γ iff S = U →AF RA where U is a D-stable extension of Γ.
Proof. ⇒. If S is a stable extension, then by Lemma 5 it is also a preferred and thus a complete extension, therefore by Proposition 6 it is the case that S = U →AF RA where U is a D-complete extension of Γ and in particular a conflict-free set. To see that U is a D-stable extension of Γ, consider a generic A ∈ A, A / ∈ U. By definition of U →AF RA it must be the case that A / ∈ U →AF RA , thus since S is a stable extension ∃α ∈ U →AF RA such that α → R A. The conclusion follows from the fact that, by definition of U →AF RA , src(α) ∈ U, and (src(α), A) ∈→.
⇐. Since U is a D-stable extension of Γ and thus a D-complete extension, by Proposition 6 it holds that S = U →AF RA is a complete extension and thus a conflict-free set of Γ. Let V be a generic element not belonging to S. If V ∈ A then by definition of U →AF RA it is the case that V / ∈ U, thus V ∈ U D+ since U is a D-stable extension. If V ∈ R then by definition of U →AF RA it holds that src(V ) / ∈ U, thus again src(V ) ∈ U D+ . In any case, ∃α with src(α) ∈ U such that α → R V , and the conclusion follows from the fact that, by definition of
The relationships among D-preferred and preferred extensions, D-stable and stable extensions, and D-grounded and grounded extensions can be easily identified in Example 3.
Example 3 (continued). {A, D} and {B, D} are both D-preferred and D-stable extensions of Γ, while {A, D, α, γ, ζ} and {B, D, β, δ, ζ} are, correspondingly, both stable and preferred extensions as defined in AF RA. The D-grounded extension of Γ is ∅ and coincides with the grounded extension as defined in AF RA (note that ∅ →AF RA = ∅).
The bijective correspondence also holds for semi-stable semantics. To show this we have to first prove a property concerning the relationship between the → AF RA operator and the range of a set.
Lemma 9. Let Γ = A, R be an AF and U ⊆ A a set of arguments. Then,
Since Γ is an AF , α → R β with β ∈ R can only hold by indirect defeat, thus range(U →AF RA ) can be expressed as
Now, by Lemma 8(3) the last expression is equal to (U
(Drange(U)) →AF RA .
Proposition 10. Let Γ = A, R be an AF . Then, S is a semi-stable extension of Γ iff S = U →AF RA where U is a D-semi-stable extension of Γ.
Proof. ⇒. Since S is a semi-stable extension of Γ, it is by definition also a complete extension, therefore by Proposition 6 it is the case that S = U (Drange(U ′ )) →AF RA , which according to Lemma 9 is equivalent to range(S) range(S ′ ), contradicting the fact that S is a semi-stable extension of Γ.
⇐. Since U is a D-complete extension of Γ, by Proposition 6 it holds that S = U →AF RA is a complete extension of Γ. Assume by contradiction that it is not semi-stable: then, there is a complete extension S ′ ⊆ (A ∪ R) such that range(S) range(S ′ ), where according to Proposition 6 it is the case that S ′ = U ′ →AF RA with U ′ ⊆ A a D-complete extension of Γ. However, applying Lemma 9 to range(S) range(S ′ ) yields (Drange(U))
→AF RA (Drange(U ′ )) →AF RA , which by Lemma 8(2) holds iff Drange(U) Drange(U ′ ), contradicting the fact that U is a D-semi-stable extension of Γ.
In order to exemplify the relationship between D-semi-stable and semi-stable extensions, let us consider again Example 3.
Example 3 (continued). The D-semi-stable extensions of Γ are {A, D} and {B, D}, while {A, D, α, γ, ζ} and {B, D, β, δ, ζ} are, correspondingly, its semistable extensions.
We finally provide the correspondence result for ideal semantics.
Proposition 11. Let Γ = A, R be an AF and let S be the ideal extension of Γ. Then, S = U →AF RA where U is the D-ideal extension of Γ.
Proof. According to Lemma 6 S is a complete extension of Γ, therefore, by Proposition 6, S = U →AF RA where U is a D-complete extension of Γ (thus in particular D-admissible). By Proposition 7, ∀ E with E a D-preferred extension of Γ E →AF RA is a preferred extension, thus by definition of ideal extension S = U →AF RA ⊆ E →AF RA , which by Lemma 8(1) yields U ⊆ E. To show that U is the D-ideal extension, we have to prove that U is the maximal subset of A satisfying the latter condition. Assume by contradiction that this is not the case: then, there is a set U ′ ⊆ A such that U U ′ and U ′ is a D-complete extension contained in all the D-preferred extensions of Γ. By Lemma 8(2), S = U →AF RA U ′ →AF RA , where, according to Proposition 6, U ′ →AF RA is a complete extension of Γ, thus admissible. Moreover, by Proposition 7 for any preferred extension Π of Γ Π = E →AF RA with E a D-preferred extension of Γ, and since U ′ ⊆ E according to Lemma 8(1) we have that U ′ →AF RA ⊆ E →AF RA = Π. Summing up, there is an admissible set, namely U ′ →AF RA , which is contained in all preferred extensions of Γ and such that S U ′ →AF RA : but this contradicts the fact that S is the ideal extension of Γ.
Example 3 (continued). The D-ideal extension of Γ is {D}, while {D, ζ} is, correspondingly, its ideal extension.
Expressing AF RA as an AF
We consider now the issue of expressing an AF RA in terms of a traditional AF and drawing the relevant correspondences concerning the notions introduced in Sections 4 and 5. This kind of correspondence provides a very useful basis for further investigations as it allows one to reuse or adapt, in the context of AF RA, the large corpus of theoretical results available in Dung's framework, in particular as far as computational complexity is concerned.
Definition 19. Let Γ = A, R be an AF RA, the corresponding AF Γ AF = A, R is defined as follows:
In words, both arguments and attacks of the original AF RA Γ become arguments of its corresponding AF -version Γ AF , while the defeat relations in AF correspond to all direct and indirect defeats in the original AF RA. We can now examine the relationships between the relevant notions in Γ and Γ AF showing that they are all bijections as desirable.
Proposition 12. Let Γ = A, R an AF RA and Γ AF = A, R its corresponding AF , S ⊆ A ∪ R and A ∈ A ∪ R:
Comparison with related works
The Extended Argumentation Framework
In recent years a generalization of Dung's framework to encompass attacks to attacks has been proposed in [9, 11] , called Extended Argumentation Framework (EAF ). This approach is motivated by the need to express preferences between arguments and supports a very interesting form of meta-level argumentation about the values that arguments promote. In EAF a limited notion of attacks to attacks is encompassed: only attacks whose target is an argument can be attacked, while attacks whose target is another attack can not be attacked in turn. In short, only one level of attacks to attacks is allowed. Referring to Figure 1 , only the attack originated from P can be represented, while the one originated from N can not.
We recall briefly the main definitions of EAF formalism.
Definition 20. An Extended Argumentation Framework (EAF ) is a tuple
Args, R, D s.t. Args is a set of arguments, and:
• R ⊆ Args × Args;
• D ⊆ Args × R;
Definition 21. Let Args, R, D be an EAF and S ⊆ Args. Then
• A def eat S B iff (A, B) ∈ R and ∄C ∈ S s.t. (C, (A, B) ) ∈ D. We write A → S B to denote that A def eat S B, and A S B to denote that A does not def eat S B;
• S is conflict-free iff ∀A, B ∈ S: if (A, B) ∈ R, then (B, A) / ∈ R and ∃C ∈ S s.t. (C, (A, B) ) ∈ D;
• A ∈ Args is acceptable w.r.t. S, iff ∀B s.t. B → S A, there is a C ∈ S s.t. C → S B and there is a reinstatement set for C → S B.
Semantics notions for EAF paralleling Dung's ones are proposed in [11] .
Definition 22. Let S be a conflict-free subset of Args in Args, R, D . Then:
• S is an admissible extension iff every argument in S is acceptable w.r.t. S.
• S is a preferred extension iff S is a set inclusion maximal admissible extension.
• S is a complete extension iff each argument which is acceptable w.r.t. S is in S.
• S is a stable extension iff ∀B / ∈ S, ∃A ∈ S s.t. A def eat S B.
Differently from the case of AF , in EAF the characteristic function is defined on conflict-free sets only and is used to define grounded semantics. In EAF the grounded semantics is defined only for finitary EAF s.
Definition 24. Args, R, D is finitary iff ∀A ∈ Args, the set {B|(B, A) ∈ R} is finite, and ∀(A, B) ∈ R, the set {C|(C, (A, B)) ∈ D} is finite.
Definition 25. Let Λ be a finitary EAF and
is the grounded extension of Λ. It is possible to draw a direct correspondence from EAF to AF RA. Apart from this formal correspondence at the definition level, four main points are worth remarking to compare EAF and AF RA.
First, as already remarked, EAF encompasses only attacks to attacks between arguments rather than the general issue of making any attack defeasible. In [20] an extension of EAF (called EAF +) has been devised which allows for recursive attacks, while attempting to follow as close as possible the original EAF definitions: it was shown that the AF RA formalism is able to cover also EAF +.
A second issue concerns the notion of conflict-free set given in Definition 21 and a constraint on the attack relation in Definition 20. Consider the following simple example. , (A, B) )}. Then, {A, B, C} is not a conflict-free set.
Suppose then that there is an argument C ′ which attacks the attack (B, A) but it is not the case that C and C ′ attack each other (this situation is illustrated in Figure 6 ). Note that the third requirement of Definition 20 is violated, therefore this case is not compatible with the EAF definition. While this restriction is justified in the context of preference modelling, where EAF has been conceived, it may turn out a limitation in other areas. Note anyway that even if this constraint was relaxed, by Definition 21 the set S = {A, B, C, C ′ } would not be conflict-free due to the mutual attack between A and B. However, coherently with other situations, S should be conflict-free since no argument in S def eat S another element in S.
The situation shown in Figure 6 can be directly encompassed in AF RA where, in particular, the set {A, B, C, C ′ , γ, δ} is conflict-free. The third issue concerns the fact that the EAF characteristic function is not monotonic in general, while it is monotonic in the special cases 4 of Hierarchical Extended Argumentation Framework (HEAF ), and Preference Symmetric Extended Argumentation Framework (psEAF ). In the HEAF the sets Args and R are partitioned in different levels which are ordered: any attack to attack can only start from a higher level than the one which contains the attacked attack. In the psEAF only attacks between symmetrically attacking arguments can be attacked by arguments expressing preferences.
These limitations do not apply to AF RA where (as in AF ) the characteristic function is monotonic (Proposition 3), ensuring further desirable properties at the semantics level.
The fourth point regards the fact that, as remarked in [11] , in general it does not hold that the grounded extension is the least complete extension: as a consequence, it is not guaranteed to be included in any complete extension nor, in particular, in any preferred extension. C, B) ). There are two preferred extensions, namely P 1 (Γ) = {C, B, γ, α} and P 2 (Γ) = {C, A, β}, while the grounded extension is {C}.
Therefore, the grounded semantics of EAF is not in correspondence with the grounded semantics of AF RA, and a "classical" relation between semantics notions does not hold in EAF .
Higher Order Argumentation Framework
In the context of reasoning about coalitions, a formalism encompassing attacks to attacks called Higher Order Argumentation Framework (HOAF) has been considered [15, 16] .
We recall literally the rather articulated definition of HOAF from [16] .
Definition 27. A Higher Order Argumentation Framework (HOAF) is a tuple A C , A, not, A # , # where A C is a set of coalition arguments, A is a set of arguments such that |A| = |A C |, not is a bijection from A C to A, A # is a set of arguments that coalitions attacks attack each other, and In HOAF attacks to attacks are not explicitly represented. In fact, the attack relation # is not recursive and relates the elements of three distinct sets, namely A C , A, and A # . The intuitive meaning of these three sets can be appreciated by regarding a HOAF as the result of a translation of an argumentation framework with recursive attacks into an AF 5 , where A C represents the set of arguments and A # the set of attacks. In fact for each element A of A C a corresponding element not(A) representing "non acceptance" of A is present in A. It is assumed that A attacks not(A), i.e. (A, not(A)) ∈ #, but not viceversa. Elements of A # represent attacks of the original argumentation framework with recursive attacks: each of these attacks has a source argument belonging to A C and a target which is either an argument in A C or another attack in A # . Then:
• for each element A of A C , it is assumed that not(A) attacks in HOAF (through #) all elements of A # whose source is A;
• each element of A # attacks in HOAF (through #) its target, either belonging to A C (if it is an argument) or to A # (if it is another attack).
Finally, by simply treating A C ∪ A ∪ A # as an undistinguished set of arguments, ignoring the not relation and using # as an attack relation, a HOAF can be regarded as a traditional AF and the relevant semantics notions are defined.
It emerges from the above discussion that, given a HOAF, a corresponding AF RA can be defined by considering only elements of A C as arguments and applying a sort of inversion of the implicit translation procedure, as proposed in Definition 28. From Definition 28 it emerges that any HOAF can be reduced to an AF RA while the (implicit) translation algorithm previously described can be used to translate an AF RA into a HOAF. Hence the two formalisms feature the same expressiveness, AF RA providing however a simpler and cleaner representation and not requiring in particular the use of the additional "not" arguments. Semantics notions are directly introduced in the AF RA formalism and shown to satify desirable properties in relation to the representation of attacks to attacks while semantics notions in HOAF are indirectly introduced with reference to a "represented AF ", and are not accompanied by such an analysis nor by the statement of reference requirements.
To exemplify, let us consider the Bob's last minute dilemma formalised by an HOAF and shown in Figure 8 . N, not(N ) ), (not(N ), N − (P − (C − G))), (N − (P − (C − G)), P − (C − G)), (P, not(P )), (not(P ), P − (C − G)), (P − (C − G), C − G), (C, not(C)), (not(C), C − G), (C − G, G), (G, not(G)), (not(G), G − C), (G − C, C)}.
The only complete, grounded, preferred, stable, semi-stable, ideal extension, according with Definition 27 is {A, P, G, not(N ), not(C), A − N, P − (C − G), G − C}. Further investigation of the relations between HOAF and AF RA is an interesting direction of future work.
Conclusion and future works
AF RA is a novel abstract argumentation formalism encompassing unlimited attacks to attacks in a quite simple formal setting and satisfying a set of basic requirements mainly concerning relationships with Dung's original AF . While direct correspondences between AF RA and AF are achieved at several levels, as shown in the paper, we remark that AF RA represents a significant conceptual advancement by regarding attacks as defeasible entities themselves. This enables the representation of situations where some kind of reasoning about attacks is carried out, whose usefulness is suggested by several recent works in the literature. In particular, meta-argumentation [21, 22] represents a promising research area where defeasibility of attacks may play a significant role as a useful modelling tool. Currently a full-fledged formalization of reasoning contexts where recursive attacks are required can be regarded as an important future research task: apart the issue of meta-argumentation mentioned above, a detailed analysis has been carried out up to now only for the case of reasoning about preferences in [11] where just one level of recursion is considered.
Independently of the actual representation needs of specific reasoning contexts, it can be remarked that AF RA, while pursuing a high generality in the definition of recursive attacks, achieves at the same time the goal of providing a simpler formalism than other (even less expressive) proposals. In fact other approaches to represent attacks to attacks in the literature appear to resort to somewhat more complicated formal structures and their semantics properties are still to be analyzed in detail and/or reveal a looser correspondence with Dung's ones, as discussed in Section 8. AF RA appears anyway to be able to encompass these formalisms while, by explicit design choice, it does not cover more radical departures from Dung framework, where the notion of recursive attacks is combined with those of argument strength or of joint and disjunctive attack [17, 23, 24] . Analyzing their relationships with AF RA represents an interesting direction of future work.
As to actual implementation in software tools, AF RA has recently been included in ASPARTIX 6 , a software tool for implementing argumentation frameworks using Answer Set Programming. As stated in [25, 26] this approach uses a fixed logic program which is capable of computing the different forms of extension from a given framework which is given as input. Due to this simple architecture, the system is easily extensible and suitable for rapid prototyping. This shows that, by its simplicity, the AF RA formalism lends itself to rather straightforward implementation. As to computational complexity, the results in Sections 6 and 7 suggest that the many already known results for AF can be applied to AF RA too.
On the application side, we have mentioned in the paper several contexts where recursive attacks can be useful. The area of modelling articulated decision processes involving reasoning with values is particularly interesting as it has been the subject of detailed analysis leading to the proposal of the Value-Based Argumentation Framework (V AF ) [4, 27] . From this perspective an analysis of the relationships between AF RA and V AF provides a significant direction of future work: some preliminary results are provided in [28] .
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